

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 EA-09 IO-13 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

USIE-00 ERDA-07 ERDE-00 NRC-07 COME-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02 PRS-01

SP-02 SS-15 ACDA-10 SAJ-01 OMB-01 TRSE-00 OES-06 EB-07

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O P 211605Z NOV 76

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7946

INFO USMISSION IAEA VIENNA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS PRIORITY

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 18783

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, TECH

SUBJECT: OBSERVER STORY ON NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS

1. THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE APPEARED IN THE NOVEMBER 21

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BEGIN TEXT

"SOVIET ARMS LIMIT BID REBUFFED

"BY NIGEL HAWKES AND DAVID MARTIN

"A MOVE BY THE SOVIET UNION TO STRENGTHEN THE SAFEGUARDS UNDER WHICH NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY IS BOUGHT AND SOLD ON THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET HAS APPARENTLY BEEN REBUFFED BY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE 'LONDON CLUB' OF NUCLEAR-EXPORTING COUNTRIES.

"THE PROPOSAL WAS PRESENTED TO THE MEETING OF THE CLUB IN LONDON EARLIER THIS MONTH BUT WON UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT FROM ONLY ONE OTHER PARTICIPANT, CANADA.

"THE OTHER NUCLEAR EXPORTING COUNTRIES, INCLUDING BRITAIN' ARE BELIEVED NOT TO HAVE ARGUED AGAINST THE SOVIET PROPOSAL BUT TO HAVE SUGGESTED THAT DISCUSSION OF IT BE DEFERRED UNTIL NEXT MARCH.

"THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE EXTENDED THE 'GUIDELINES' UNDER WHICH MEMBERS OF THE CLUB AGREE TO SELL NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. STATES WHICH DO NOT ALREADY HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD IN FUTURE RECEIVE NUCLEAR SUPPLIES FROM MEMBERS OF THE CLUB ONLY IF THEY ACCEPT THE SAFEGUARDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, BASED IN VIENNA, ON ALL THEIR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES.

"IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD MEAN THAT BY ACCEPTING A SINGLE ITEM ON THE LONDON CLUB'S 'TRIGGER LIST' OF CRITICALLY IMPORTANT NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND DEVICES, A RECIPIENT COUNTRY WOULD THEN BE OBLIGED TO OPEN ALL ITS INSTALLATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION.

"THE PROPOSAL IS IMPORTANT, BECAUSE IT IS KNOWN TO HAVE THE SUPPORT OF DR. SIGVARD EKLUND, DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE IAEA, AND IS BELIEVED BY EXPERTS TO BE THE MOST POWERFUL WEAPON THE NUCLEAR EXPORTING COUNTRIES COULD EMPLOY AGAINST PROLIFERATION.

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"AT THE CLUB'S RECENT MEETING, THE UNITED STATES IS BELIEVED TO HAVE SUPPORTED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IN PRINCIPLE, BUT TO HAVE DEFERRED A DECISION ON IT FOR THE NEXT MEETING IN MARCH, ON THE GROUNDS THAT A NEW ADMINISTRATION UNDER PRESIDENT CARTER WILL BY THEN HAVE TAKEN OFFICE. BRITAIN IS SAID TO HAVE ARGUED FOR A MORE CAUTIOUS, STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH, AND OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING FRANCE, JAPAN AND WEST GERMANY, EXPRES-

SED VARIOUS RESERVATIONS.

"THE SECRECY OF THE LONDON CLUB, WHICH BEGAN AS THE
'GROUP OF 7' IN THE SUMMER OF 1975, IS GRADUALLY BEGIN-
NING TO CRUMBLE. THE INITIAL MEETINGS, ATTENDED BY
THE SEVEN ORIGINAL MEMBERS (UK, USA, USSR, FRANCE, WEST
GERMANY, JAPAN AND CANADA) HAVE NOW EXPANDED TO INCLUDE
BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, EAST GERMANY, HOLLAND, POLAND,
ITALY AND SWEDEN. AT THE MOST RECENT MEETING, SWITZER-
LAND WAS PRESENT AS AN OBSERVER.

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"A DOCUMENT OBTAINED BY THE OBSERVER LAST WEEK LISTS THE GUIDELINES UNDER WHICH THE CLUB OPERATES, AND THE 'TRIGGER LIST' OF SENSITIVE MATERIALS COVERED BY THE UNCLASSIFIED

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AGREEMENT.

"THE GUIDELINES COVER FIVE MAJOR POINTS. FIRST, THEY INSIST THAT ITEMS ON THE TRIGGER LIST CAN BE TRANSFERRED TO NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES ONLY 'UPON FORMAL GOVERNMENTAL ASSURANCES FROM RECIPIENTS EXPLICITLY EXCLUDING USES WHICH WOULD RESULT IN ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.' THIS RULES OUT BOTH BOMBS AND THE SO-CALLED 'PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS' (PNES).

"SECONDLY, THE GUIDELINES INSIST THAT NUCLEAR MATERIALS MUST BE 'PLACED UNDER EFFECTIVE PHYSICAL PROTECTION TO PREVENT UNAUTHORISED USE AND HANDLING.' THIS IS INTENDED TO PREVENT SABOTAGE OR THEFT OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS BY TERRORIST GROUPS.

"THIRDLY, THE GUIDELINES COVER THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY, INCLUDING REPROCESSING, ENRICHMENT, AND HEAVY-WATER PRODUCTION -- ALL TECHNIQUES USEFUL IN THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. A SPECIAL CONTROL IS IMPOSED ON ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGY; THE RECIPIENT NATION IS OBLIGED TO AGREE THAT THE TECHNOLOGY WILL NOT BE USED TO DESIGN PLANTS CAPABLE OF ENRICHING URANIUM SUFFICIENTLY TO MANUFACTURE A BOMB. A LIMIT OF 20 PERCENT ENRICHMENT -- AMPLE FOR NUCLEAR REACTORS, BUT NOT ENRICHED ENOUGH FOR BOMBS -- IS LAID DOWN IN THE GUIDELINES.

"FINALLY, THE GUIDELINES PROHIBIT THE RETRANSFER OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS TO THIRD PARTIES, A RULE INTENDED TO PREVENT RECIPIENT COUNTRIES FROM PASSING ON THEIR KNOWLEDGE TO OTHER NON-NUCLEAR STATES. SUCH RETRANSFER CANNOT BE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINAL SUPPLIER.

"THE 'TRIGGER LIST' OF THE LONDON CLUB' ALSO IN THE

HANDS OF THE OBSERVER, IS INTENDED TO BE A COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF ALL MATERIALS WHICH COULD BE USED FOR THE PRODUCTION OF BOMBS. IT INCLUDES NUCLEAR REACTORS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING MORE THAN 100 GRAMS OF PLUTONIUM A YEAR, REACTOR PRESSURE VESSELS, REACTOR FUEL CHARGING
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AND DISCHARGING MACHINES, REACTOR CONTROL RODS, PRESSURE TUBES AND PRIMARY COOLANT PUMPS. SOMEWHAT SURPRISINGLY, IT ALSO INCLUDES ZIRCONIUM TUBES, WHICH CAN BE USED AS FUEL CLADDING IN REACTORS.

"UNDER ENRICHMENT, THE TRIGGER LIST INCLUDES EVERY TECHNOLOGY SO FAR DEvised FOR ENRICHING URANIUM -- GAS DIFFUSION, GAS CENTRIFUGE, THE JET NOZZLE AND THE VORTEX TYPE.

"ALTHOUGH AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE GUIDELINES AND THE TRIGGER LIST, THERE ARE SIGNS THAT SOME OF THE NEWER MEMBERS OF THE CLUB ARE UNHAPPY ABOUT THE WAY DECISIONS ARE MADE. AT THIS MONTH'S MEETING, THERE WAS CRITICISM OF THE DOMINANCE OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES IN THE CLUB, AND THE SUPER-POWERS WERE WARNED TO TAKE MORE NOTICE OF THE INTERESTS OF THE NON-WEAPON STATES. IN PARTICULAR, AMERICAN ATTEMPTS TO ALTER OR PREVENT CONTRACTS BETWEEN FRANCE AND PAKISTAN AND WEST GERMANY AND BRAZIL MET WITH RESENTMENT. "
END TEXT

ARMSTRONG

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